

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 FEA-01 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01  
CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 EB-08 FPC-01 H-01 INR-07  
INT-05 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-05 USIA-06  
OES-07 SP-02 SS-15 STR-05 TRSE-00 ACDA-12 PA-01  
PRS-01 /112 W  
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P R 071900Z DEC 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5064  
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO  
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

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E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: ENRG, BR  
SUBJ: PRESS REPORTING ON NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: BRASILIA 6221

1. SUMMARY. FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL COLUMNS OF OPINION IN THE BRAZILIAN PRESS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. ONE COLUMN BY LAURA FONSECA EXAMINES U.S. DEALINGS WITH BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA AND CONCLUDES THAT THE U.S. IS ATTEMPTING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THESE TWO NATIONS TO ADVANCE U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS. THE SECOND, BY LUIZ ALBERTO BAHIA, IS OUTSPOKENLY CRITICAL OF THE GOB "INFLEXIBILITY" ON THE QUESTION OF REPROCESSING AND ADDS THAT THE ISSUES SEPARATING BRAZIL AND THE U.S. AFFECT THE NUCLEAS OF POWER IN BRAZIL, THE MILITARY. IN ADDITION TO THESE EDITORIAL PIECES, THE GERMAN MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IS REPORTED TO HAVE

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STATED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS TO AUGMENT GUARANTEES AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THAT THERE COULD BE "TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS" IN THE BRAZIL/GERMAN NUCLEAR ACCORD. END SUMMARY.

2. IN A COLUMN IN O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, NOVEMBER 24, HEADLINED "INSISTENCE OF ARGENTINA FORCED THE VISIT TO

BRAZIL", FONSECA CITING DIPLOMATIC SOURCES, STATES THAT THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BRAZIL WAS COMPLETED IN 1977, DESPITE A PREFERENCE FOR A LATER DATE, BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE COMPLAINTS AGAINST A CONCELLATION. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO STATE THAT THE U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY IS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MUTUAL SUSPICION BETWEEN BRAZIL-ARGENTINA AND PUSH FOR AGREEMENT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY CONTROLLED REPROCESSING PLANT. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONTAIN EXCERPTS FROM THAT ARTICLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT: "A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE (VANCE) DELEGATION IN BUENOS AIRES AND IN BRAZIL DEMONSTRATES INTERESTING FACTS, ACCORDING TO COMMENTS IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES. THE ARGENTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS THE OBJECT OF PRAISE AND APPLAUSE, BECAUSE THE USE OF HEAVY WATER REACTORS AND NATURAL URANIUM DOES NOT POSE A GREAT RISK OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES, DURING THE STAY IN BRASILIA, VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION EMPHASIZED THAT ARGENTINA IS WELL ADVANCED IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, WELL IN FRONT OF BRAZIL."

4. "FEAR IS THE TRADITIONAL ALLY OF CARTER IN HIS CRUSADE AGAINST NUCLEAR PROGRAMS USING SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, CAPABLE OF PRODUCING, EASILY, NUCLEAR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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WEAPONS. HE HAS USED THE FEAR OF A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST AS A SOLID ARGUMENT AGAINST REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT PLANTS FORESEEN IN THE BRAZIL/GERMANY NUCLEAR ACCORD, AS WELL AS PLANTS OF THE SAME TYPE IN JAPAN AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES."

5. "DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES COMMENT THAT AMERICAN DIPLOMACY FOUND A NEW METHOD TO UTILIZE THE FEAR AS A POLITICAL WEAPON, THROWING THE ELEMENT OF THE "ATOMIC BOMB" INTO THE ALREADY TENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRASILIA AND BUENOS AIRES. ON ONE HAND, THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ARGENTINES LOOK SUSPICIOUSLY AT THE BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. BECAUSE OF THE FEAR THAT BRAZIL WILL DECIDE TO PRODUCE BOMBS, ARGENTINA HAS PLANS TO DEVELOP ITS OWN TECHNOLOGY OF REPROCESSING IN ORDER TO ALSO HAVE PLUTONIUM AT ITS DISPOSAL.

6. "AS THE PLANS TO NOT LIE AT THE HEART OF THE ARGENTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AND ARE SEEN ONLY AS A TACTIC IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST BRAZIL, ARGENTINA WOULD BE DISPOSED TO RENOUNCE THESE PLANS IF THE

U.S. WOULD FURNISH FORMAL GUARANTEES THAT BRAZIL WOULD ALSO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO PLUTONIUM. WITHIN THIS TRADITIONAL RIVALRY, THE AMERICANS CATCH THE GLIMPSE OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO FRIGHTEN BRAZIL WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT ARGENTINA IS MORE ADVANCED AND, WITH THIS, MOVE FORWARD THEIR PLANS TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL REPROCESSING PLANT IN LATIN AMERICA UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

7. "ITAMARATY, IN ITS ANALYSIS OF VANCE'S CONVERSATIONS IN THE COUNTRY, WAS FORMAL: THERE WAS NO PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL REPROCESSING PLANT NOR A DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A MULTINATIONAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CONTROL OF NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ON THE CONTINENT. THERE WERE NO PRESSURES AGAINST THE BRAZIL/GERMANY

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ACCORD NOR DID THE U.S. SOLICIT THE SIGNATURE OF  
BRAZIL FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY..."

8. "... A STRONG EFFORT WILL BE ATTEMPTED DURING THE  
NEXT VISIT OF CARTER, THAT ACCORDING TO SOURCES IN  
CARACAS WILL HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED THE AGREEMENT OF  
PEREZ, ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS  
OVER NUCLEAR PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA. HAVING  
PLANTED THE SEED OF MUTUAL FEAR IN BOTH BRAZIL AND  
ARGENTINA, THE AMERICANS PLAN (IS) TO HARVEST AN  
EVOLUTION IN THE BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE POSITIONS  
THAT PERMITS A GLIMMER OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION FOR  
ALL ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR IMPASSE ON THE CONTINENT." END TEXT.

9. IN A COLUMN IN THE NOVEMBER 24TH ISSUE OF THE  
FOLHA DO SAO PAULO, LUIZ ALBERTO BAHIA COMMENTED ON  
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND BRAZIL. BAHIA  
WAS OF THE OPINION THAT A COMPARISON OF THE SPEECHES  
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AT ITAMARATY (THE FOREIGN MINISTRY) REVEALED GREATER  
AGGRESSIVENESS ON THE PART OF BRAZIL IN DISCUSSIONS  
OF THESE DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. HE NOTED THAT WHILE  
SECRETARY VANCE CAREFULLY AVOIDED USING THE WORD  
"DIFFERENCES" FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA MADE ALLUSIONS  
TO THE NECESSITY OF RECIPROCITY IN THE US/BRAZILIAN  
RELATIONSHIP AND CALLED ATTENTION TO THE EXISTENCE  
OF "ISSUES IN WHICH WE HAVE LEGITIMATE, DISTINCT  
INTERESTS, EVEN DIFFERENCES".

10. BAHIA FELT THE PRINCIPAL AREA OF CONFLICT WAS  
BRAZIL'S DECISION "TO ACQUIRE CONTROL OF THE MILITARILY  
CRITICAL AREA OF NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING TO OBTAIN  
PLUTONIUM, THE PRIMARY MATERIAL FOR THE BOMB". "IT  
APPEARS EVIDENT BRAZILIAN INFLEXIBILITY, IN THE CASE  
OF REPROCESSING, CONFORMS WITH A MILITARY POLICY OF  
SUPPORT FOR THE MULTIBILLION DOLLAR NUCLEAR ACCORD  
TO CONSTRUCT PLANTS FOR THE GENERATION OF ENERGY. FOR  
PRECISELY THIS REASON, THE DIFFERENCES AFFECT THE  
MILITARY CORE OF THE TRADITIONAL US/BRAZIL ALLIANCE  
AND JEOPARDIZE VARIOUS AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES."

11. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO QUESTION THE PREMISES  
ON WHICH THE NUCLEAR ACCORD IS BASED AND WARNS OF THE  
CONSEQUENCES FOR STABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA. "IT IS  
MORE THAN CLEAR THAT BRAZIL COULD HAVE NUCLEAR  
ENERGY WITHOUT INVESTING RESOURCES IN REPROCESSING  
PLANTS. THE ARGUMENT OF DEPENDENCE IS FOOLISH BECAUSE  
THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT WE WOULD BE MORE DEPENDENT

IF WE HAD AGREED TO A MULTINATIONAL AND REGIONAL REPROCESSING PROJECT. WE WOULD BE CO-OWNERS OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT AND BE COOPERATING IN A DECISIVE FASHION TO STOP NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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IN LATIN AMERICA. PROLIFERATION WILL BE ALMOST INEVITABLE IF BRAZIL CARRIES FORWARD ITS DETERMINATION TO PROCESS (SPENT FUEL) TO OBTAIN A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THE BRAZILIAN INSISTENCE WOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD OVERSEAS AND IN ARGENTINA AS SIGNIFYING THAT CERTAIN BRAZILIAN MILITARY STRATEGISTS HAVE DECIDED TO ACQUIRE ATOMIC TECHNOLOGY FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. A NUCLEAR RACE WOULD OPEN A NEW ISSUE OF SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE." BAHIA WENT ON TO APPROVE OF THE CAUTIOUS U.S. APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPROCESSING, STATING THAT "IF THIS CAUTIOUS APPROACH IS NOT HEARD BY GOVERNMENTS MOTIVATED BY INTENTIONS OF MILITARY POWER THERE WILL BE HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, CONSIDERABLY INCREASING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT."

12. THE ARTICLE THEN SHIFTS TO THE ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS. "THE MOTIVES OF PRESTIGE AND INTERNATIONAL POWER PREVAILS IN BRAZIL, INCLUDING THE OPPOSITION (PARTY). SENATOR FRANCO MONTORO ALLIED HIMSELF WITH THE SIDE OF THOSE THAT WANT A PROCESSING PLANT, UNDER THE ALLEGATION THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS PRESSURING US AS IF WE WERE AN IRRESPONSIBLE NATION. SENATOR MONTORO SHOULD HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE OPPOSITION. IT WOULD BE ENOUGH THAT HE READ THE SPEECHES OF EX-CHANCELOR SANTIAGO DANTAS TO UNDERSTAND OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IS NECESSARY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF PEACE. AND THIS WILL NOT BE CONSTRUCTED FAVORING THE SPREAD OF PLUTONIUM THROUGH THE WORLD UNDER THE IRRATIONAL MOTIVATION OF PRESTIGE AND NATIONAL POWER. (BRAZIL) LOSES THE RIGHT TO CRITICIZE THE GREAT NUCLEAR POWERS WHEN (BRAZIL ITSELF) WANTS TO BE, AT THE SAME TIME, A NUCLEAR POWER."

13. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE VANCE VISIT DIDN'T LEAD TO A CONVERGENCE ON THE TWO PRIMARY ISSUES, NUCLEAR POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. BAHIA STATED THAT THESE TWO ISSUES "AFFECT THE NUCLEUS OF POWER IN BRAZIL; THE ARMED FORCES. AND, IN THIS SENSE, THE NEW MILITARY NATIONALISM IN BRAZIL CREATES CLEAR-CUT BARRIERS TO THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN BRASILIA LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AND WASHINGTON."

14. THE FOLHA DE SAO PAULO OF DECEMBER 4 PRINTED INTERVIEWS

GIVEN BY SCHMIDT KUSTER (FRG MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY) AND PAULO NOGUEIRA BATISTA (PRESIDENT OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION - NUCLEBRAS) AFTER SPEECHES AT THE GETULIO VARGAS FOUNDATION IN RIO. SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS, WHICH REITERATED PREVIOUS CRITICISMS OF THE BRAZIL/GERMAN NUCLEAR ACCORD, WERE AS INTERESTING AS THE ANSWERS. THE ARTICLE ALSO PRESENTED INTERESTING TIDBITS FROM THE SPEECHES AND LATER DISCUSSION. BATISTA, IN HIS SPEECH, STATED THAT BRAZIL HAS

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P R 071900Z DEC 77

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INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

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INVESTED AROUND 300 MILLION DOLLARS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY UP UNTIL THE PRESENT MOMENT. HE ALSO REPORTEDLY CONFIRMED, WITHOUT NAMING A DATE, THAT BRAZIL WILL SHORTLY SIGN A CONTRACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ENRICHMENT PLANT. IN THE DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE SPEECHES, JOHN COTRIM (TECHNICAL DIRECTOR OF THE ITAIPU BINACIONAL) REFUTED GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE SCHMIDT KUSTER'S CONTENTION THAT COST INCREASES IN HYDRO-ELECTRIC PLANTS AND THE COST OF TRANSPORTING ENERGY LONG DISTANCES MAKES NUCLEAR POWER COMPETITIVE. HE STATED THAT "THE COST OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IS ONE AND A HALF TO TWO TIMES MORE EXPENSIVE THAN HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER AT THE POINT OF GENERATION, EVEN INCLUDING THE COST OF LONG DISTANCE TRANSMISSION."

15. IN THE INTERVIEWS AFTER THE SPEECHES, SCHMIDT KUSTER RECEIVED

SOME POINTED QUESTIONS ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE ARGUMENT.  
EXAMPLE: QUESTION - "SOME BRAZILIAN PHYSICISTS THINK  
THAT WITH THE ACCORD BRAZIL IS ACQUIRING OUT-OF-DATE TECHNOLOGY.  
WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THIS?" SCHMIDT KUSTER - "I HAVE ALREADY HEARD  
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THIS COMMENT AND I WOULD LIKE TO STATE SIMPLY THAT THIS IS COMPLETE  
NONSENSE. THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE LIGHT WATER REACTOR IS THE  
MOST ADVANCED AND IS USED BY ALL OF THE ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED  
COUNTRIES BECAUSE IT IS THE MOST ECONOMICALLY VIABLE. IT IS GOING  
TO TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE A BETTER TECHNOLOGY APPEARS."

16. KUSTER ALSO ADMITTED THAT THERE COULD BE SOME "TECHNICAL  
MODIFICATIONS" IN THE ACCORD AS A RESULT OF THE SEARCH FOR WAYS  
OF STRENGTHENING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.  
QUESTION - "HOW DO YOU VIEW THE NORTH AMERICAN PRESSURE AGAINST  
THE GERMAN/BRAZIL ACCORD? SCHMIDT KUSTER - "ALL OF US KNOW THAT  
THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS SOME PRE-  
CONCEIVED IDEAS ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY,  
PRINCIPALLY ABOUT THE QUESTION OF REPROCESSING, AND IS LOOKING  
FOR OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS TO AUGMENT THE GUARANTEES THAT THE TECHNOLOGY  
COULD BE USED WITHOUT THE DANGER OF DIVERSION OF INTENT. THIS  
IDEA HAS BEEN EXAMINED AND IT IS PERFECTLY VIABLE THAT THERE  
COULD BE THE OCCURRENCE OF TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS WITHIN OUR  
AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION. I WANT TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN THE  
FRG SIGNS AN ACCORD, IT RESPECTS IT."

17. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH COMPARISONS BASED ON A FEW ARTICLES CAN  
BE MISLEADING, AND COLUMNS OF OPINION HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN  
PUBLISHED RAISING DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS  
OF THE NUCLEAR ACCORD, IT APPEARS THAT THE BRAZILIAN PRESS IS  
BEGINNING, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, TO REEXAMINE THE GERMAN BRAZILIAN

ACCORD OF COOPERATION. NOT ALL ARTICLES ARE CRITICAL (ALTHOUGH  
THE GROUNDS FOR DEFENDING THE ACCORD ARE BEGINNING TO SHIFT  
SOMEWHAT (SEE SEPTEL) BUT STRONGLY CRITICAL ARTICLES SUCH AS  
THE ONE BY BAHIA CERTAINLY WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE THIS LAST SUMMER.  
PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, THE CRITICISMS BY BRAZILIAN PHYSICISTS  
(SUCH AS GOLDBERG) OVER TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE  
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BEGINNING TO GAIN GREATER ATTENTION AND SEEM TO BE MORE WIDELY  
ACCEPTED. THE ARTICLES AND PRESS QUESTIONS REPORTED ABOVE PROVIDE  
SOME EVIDENCE OF THIS. BAHIA'S FLAT ASSERTION THAT CLAIMS THAT  
THE ACCORD INCREASES BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENCE ARE "FOOLISH", THE  
PRESS QUESTION ON WHETHER THE TECHNOLOGY TO BE RECEIVED UNDER

THE ACCORD IS OUTDATED, ALL DERIVE FROM ARGUMENTS ORIGINALLY  
MADE BY BRAZILIAN PHYSICISTS (SEE REFTEL). THIS DOES NOT MEAN  
THAT PUBLIC OPINION HAS TURNED AGAINST THE ACCORD AND CERTAINLY  
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DETERMINATION OF THE GOB IS  
FLAGGING. HOWEVER, THERE IS BEGINNING TO BE SOME PUBLIC DEBATE  
OVER WHAT ONCE OBVIOUSLY WAS A SACRED COW.  
JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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